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[359] 
Essay 
The Morality of Law Practice 
Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr.* 
This is an inquiry about the morality of lawyers and law practice. Some modern 
academic critiques hold law practice to be immoral or unjust as compared to the 
standard of “common morality” or of the sense of “justice” shared in the community. 
This Essay advances a different standard of reference, one that takes into account the 
pervasive conflicts within society and the limitations on the government’s ability to get 
at the truth. These limitations generate a role for lawyers as empowered figures who 
employ government authority as partisans and confidantes for their clients. That role is 
comparable to other roles that involve exercise of authority, particularly the roles of 
government officials and business managers.  
 
 * Professor Emeritus, University of California Hastings College of Law; member of the State 
Bar of California. My thanks to Charles Marcus, Susan Pinto, Morris Ratner, Dana Remus, Anthony 
Scirica, and Nicholas Whipps for many helpful suggestions. 
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Introduction 
This Essay examines the basic elements of law practice, including 
the basic rules of professional ethics and current critiques of the legal 
profession, and then sets out a different framework. 
I.  The Limitations on Effective Government 
Bernard Williams, the noted philosopher, observed in Professional 
Morality and Its Dispositions, that the legal profession “exists because of 
imperfection . . . [and to] serve our needs . . . for a social order.”1 
The “need for social order” implies that we must coordinate 
conflicting objectives of individuals and institutions in our complex 
pluralistic society. The basic mechanism for doing so is private contract, 
ranging from informal exchange at the grocery store to technical 
documentation in complex financial transactions. Where formal and 
informal voluntary contracting are not feasible, government regulations 
often step in. In a constitutional regime, government regulations can be 
considered a form of public contract in that they are the product of 
negotiations inherent in the legislative process. Government regulation 
 
 1. Bernard Williams, Professional Morality and Its Dispositions, in The Good Lawyer: Lawyers’ 
Roles and Lawyers’ Ethics 259, 269 (David Luban ed., 1984) [hereinafter The Good Lawyer]. 
Hazard_14 (EGK).DOC (Do Not Delete) 3/21/2015 4:24 PM 
February 2015]             THE MORALITY OF LAW PRACTICE 361 
ranges from ordinary police work to complex administrative 
intervention. It also includes ordinary civil litigation, which is where 
ordinary law practice comes in. 
But there are serious “imperfections” in the process of bringing 
these controls to bear. The perfectly just imposition of legal controls 
would require a perfectly accurate determination of facts and a perfectly 
coherent application of law to the facts. In the real world, however, the 
legal system must make do with artificially determined facts and 
approximations of coherent law. Ordinary law practice requires 
practitioners to function within those limitations. 
II.  Fact and Law 
True justice depends on genuine truth, but real world tribunals have 
access to truth only as it appears from “evidence.” Most evidence 
consists of oral accounts about past events that have since disappeared. 
Concerning those events, the disputants have differing accounts and 
other witnesses may have still other versions. Documentary evidence can 
never be completely unambiguous, and documents may conceal as much 
as they reveal. Furthermore, ethical and evidentiary rules exclude highly 
relevant information from evidence, notably what the parties have told 
their respective lawyers behind the shield of attorney-client privilege, 
what the lawyers have experimented with behind the shield of the work-
product rule, and, in criminal cases, the shield of the accused’s privilege 
against self-incrimination. 
The shortcomings of how our modern legal system expresses rules 
of law contribute further to the problem. “Rules of law” are expressed in 
general verbal formulations, not in specific mandates addressed to 
concrete events. But legal disputes involve idiosyncratic, concrete events 
to which specific judgmental response is required. Accordingly, there is a 
tension between the generality of the rules and the specificity of the 
judgments required in resolving concrete disputes. As Justice Oliver 
Wendell Holmes concisely put it, “General propositions do not decide 
concrete cases.”2 
Moreover, the American legal system is unusually complex so that 
even the governing generalities are often uncertain. In our system, even 
detailed regulatory specifications are subordinate to the very general 
constitutional requirements of Due Process and Equal Protection. In any 
given case, for example, a commercial building development or an 
environmental control, potentially relevant rules emanate from all levels 
of government—federal, state, and local.3  
 
 2. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 3. See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005); see also Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep’t of 
Envtl. Quality of Or., 511 U.S. 93 (1994). 
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Because trial court rulings are subject to reversal, any court’s ruling 
may be equivocal. All court decisions short of the Supreme Court of the 
United States have only regional authority, and even Supreme Court 
decisions lack permanent authority. Thus, as a practical matter, much of 
the law is a kaleidoscope. Incompletely accurate facts and imprecise law 
mean that any given adjudication can be, in an important sense, 
defective. 
Justice Robert Jackson observed about the Supreme Court of the 
United States that: “We are not final because we are infallible, but we 
are infallible only because we are final.”4 The same can be said of the 
legal system as a whole. 
III.  The Milieu of Uncertainty 
When parties have a shared understanding of a situation—their 
respective personal and property rights, their expectations, and so on—
their relationship normally can be harmonized without difficulty. In these 
circumstances, the parties have no need for legal assistance, or at most, 
they need only formal documentation of their relationship. But when 
parties require involvement from lawyers, it is typically because the 
parties’ understandings and aims are in conflict and beset by confusion. It 
is the lawyer’s job to facilitate the resolution of these conflicts, by either 
negotiating an agreement between the parties or counseling their clients 
about dealing with the unresolved situation. Lawyers’ work, thus, 
necessarily involves conflict and a measure of confusion. 
The kaleidoscopic nature of law practice in the real world, 
therefore, means that lawyering is usually conducted in a milieu of 
uncertainty—uncertainty as to the facts of a situation, uncertainty as to 
the motives and purposes of the parties, and often uncertainty as to the 
rules of law that might govern. On another level, there can be a 
fundamental uncertainty about the social standard for truthfulness, 
candor, and responsibility to others. 
It is convenient to suppose that community sentiment is 
substantially uniform, but American mores in fact are heterogeneous. 
However, as we shall see through a review of various critiques, a 
supposed “common morality” is typically invoked in appraising lawyers’ 
conduct. 
IV.  Another Framework 
There is an alternative framework, formulated by Sir Isaiah Berlin, 
which sustains, and perhaps better explains, American law practice. This 
alternative begins with the recognition that the lawyer’s role involves 
 
 4. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring). 
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distinctive authority and obligations. These include the authority to 
speak in court (the “right of audience” as it is traditionally called); the 
right to provide realistic legal advice; the right to act as a partisan; and 
the right and duty to maintain secrecy in handling client affairs.5 A 
lawyer’s authority requires her to invoke governmental power on behalf 
of clients—bringing or resisting a lawsuit. It includes giving frank advice 
about the imperfections in law—advice that may enable a client to act 
unlawfully. It grants immunity from retribution for pursuing an outcome 
that the lawyer personally could consider unjust. 
In this alternative framework, lawyers are governed not by a 
“personal morality” professed in the community at large, but by a 
morality involved in the “public organization”—the government itself. 
Whether and how far law practice should be endowed with this 
distinctive authority is, of course, debatable. Nevertheless, as Professor 
Angelo Dondi and I have explained in Legal Ethics: A Comparative 
Study, these elements of the lawyer’s role have origins going back 
centuries and are recognized in all constitutional regimes.6 
V.  Realities of Law Practice 
A lawyer’s work can be boiled down to four main functions: giving 
legal advice, litigation, negotiation, and documentation of agreements. In 
each of these functions, a lawyer will almost invariably be called to do 
something that contravenes a traditional sense of common morality. 
Legal advice, involved in all lawyer tasks, aims foremost at optimizing a 
client’s position. Litigation can require lawyers to endorse positions that 
they would not adopt for themselves. Negotiation typically entails a 
measure of dissimulation. Many lawyer-drafted agreements can be over-
reaching. 
All these functions have been subjected to intense criticism, some of 
which is reviewed in this Essay. As we shall see, Professor Markovits has 
said that lawyers necessarily lie and cheat;7 Professor Simon has said that 
traditional legal ethics requires lawyers to pursue unjust objectives; and 
Professor Luban has said that lawyers act immorally when they pursue 
for a client an objective they would not pursue for themselves. 
These criticisms are at least partly true. It is certainly true that some 
lawyers tell lies for the purpose of deceiving others. Litigation and 
negotiation are sometimes protracted for strategic reasons, rather than 
being centered on the merits. Lawful partisanship and zeal can devolve 
into unprofessional aggression. Legal advice can be a roadmap to illegal 
conduct. 
 
 5. See generally Charles W. Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics ch. 15 (1986). 
 6. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. & Angelo Dondi, Legal Ethics: A Comparative Study 93 (2004). 
 7. Daniel Markovits, A Modern Legal Ethics: Adversary Advocacy in a Democratic Age 4 (2008). 
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But part of the reason for this supposed immoral conduct is that 
each of these four functions, coupled with a lawyer’s ethical obligations 
to her client, necessarily requires a measure of pretense and deceit. In 
particular, lawyers must maintain a high degree of secrecy, not least 
concerning their consultations with clients. To maintain secrecy is to 
withhold truth, which requires diplomatic skill and sometimes 
dissimulation. Dissimulation can amount to deception, and deception is 
functionally similar to the use of force, in that it can induce an opposite 
party to undertake action voluntarily that otherwise would be 
undertaken only under coercion. 
Negotiation is central to law practice, whether in addressing 
settlement of litigation or the resolution of a proposed transaction. 
Negotiation is a set of exchanges in which the parties can move from 
unresolved difference to an agreeable midpoint. Skillful negotiation 
requires lawyers to understand the opposing party’s vital interests but 
remain reserved about the client’s interests. A measure of pretense can 
sound out possibilities with the aim of “getting to yes.”8 
Even lawyers’ work in documentation can entail difficult ethical 
problems. When an opposing party (or its lawyer) is unaware of essential 
facts, does a lawyer have an obligation to remedy that ignorance? The 
judicial authority on that issue is in conflict.9 
Lawyers are also sometimes subject to criticism for exploiting, or at 
least doing nothing to remedy, asymmetry in legal positions. In so-called 
“adhesion contracts,” for example, the stronger party essentially dictates 
the contract terms while the weaker party simply adheres to the 
proposed terms, or foregoes the transaction.10 Most contracts involving 
consumers are adhesion contracts—credit cards, car rentals, bank 
accounts, and so on. 
There is further asymmetry in the distribution of legal services, a 
situation that is commonly a basis of criticism of the legal profession. In 
crude terms, it is complained that the rich have all the lawyers in their 
pocket. Indeed, the clients who provide the biggest financial returns to a 
law practice are typically businesses and other organizations. This 
common form of law practice, through myriad contracts, enables 
capitalist entrepreneurship to function. 
 
 8. See generally Melissa L. Nelken, Negotiation: Theory and Practice ch. 8 (2d ed. 2007). 
Lawyers can use stylized phrases to distinguish pretense from truth. Thus, “I can’t recommend that to 
my client” can be code for “We reject that,” while “I represent that this . . .” is code for “This is true”. 
See generally Robert J. Condlin, Bargaining in the Dark: The Normative Incoherence of Lawyer 
Dispute Bargaining Role, 51 Md. L. Rev. 1 (1992).  
 9. Compare, e.g., Brown v. Cnty. of Genesee, 872 F.2d 169 (6th Cir. 1989), with Stare v. Tate, 
98 Cal. Rptr. 264 (Cal. Ct. App. 1971). 
 10. For example, in Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, a Seattle resident injured on a cruise ship 
was required by a clause in her ticket to bring her suit for damages in Florida, where the cruise 
company was headquartered. 499 U.S. 585 (1991). 
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This asymmetry is essentially a problem of public policy, not 
individual lawyer ethics or conduct. The Supreme Court has maintained 
that there is no constitutional right to legal assistance in civil matters, and 
Congress is allergic to legal aid that could pursue substantial legal 
change. Compounding the problem, many states and localities are 
parsimonious regarding legal assistance to people of modest means.11 
Business organizations need lawyers to facilitate “compliance” with the 
law.12 But corporate lawyering also can facilitate evasion of the law, as 
we shall see through Professor Norman Spaulding. In sum, the ideal of 
equal justice accordingly remains an ideal. The current realities of law 
practice encourage, or at least do nothing to deter, the pretense and 
ambivalence toward inequality that are the subject of many critiques of 
lawyers. Lawyers contribute to the problem by adhering to the principle 
that legal assistance can be provided only by licensed lawyers.13  
VI.  Critiques of Lawyers’ Ethics 
It is uncomfortable to recognize that coercion, deception, and 
unequal access to justice are aspects of ordinary law practice. Indeed, 
there has been criticism of lawyers on these grounds as long as there 
have been lawyers. In thirteenth-century England, for example, as 
Professor Jonathan Rose has shown in The Legal Profession in Medieval 
England,14 there were regulatory efforts by the Crown to control lawyer 
malfeasance. A prime target was what was called “ambidextrous” 
conduct, referring to lawyers who worked on both sides of a transaction 
or controversy—what today we call conflict of interest.15 Other targets 
were excessive fees and procrastination, evils that still persist.16 
 
 11. See, e.g., Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18 (1981) (no constitutional right to civil legal 
assistance); Deborah L. Rhode, Pro Bono in Principle and in Practice (2005) (legal profession’s 
modest efforts to provide pro bono legal assistance); David Luban, Taking Out the Adversary: The 
Assault on Progressive Public Interest Lawyers, 91 Calif. L. Rev. 209 (2003) (restrictions on civil legal 
aid). 
 12. See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 392 (1981). 
 13. See Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 5.4(b) (2013) (“A lawyer shall not form a 
partnership with a nonlawyer . . . .”); Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 5.5(a) (2013) (“A lawyer 
shall not practice law in a jurisdiction in violation of the regulation of the legal profession . . . or assist 
another in doing so.”).  
 14. Jonathan Rose, The Legal Profession in Medieval England: A History of Regulation, 
48 Syracuse L. Rev. 1, 41–105 (1998). 
 15. Jonathan Rose, Of Ambidexters and Daffidowndillies: Defamation of Lawyers, Legal Ethics, 
and Professional Reputation, 8 U. Chi. L. Sch. Roundtable 423, 447–48 (2001).  
 16. See, e.g., Bushman v. State Bar of Cal., 522 P.2d 312, 315 (Cal. 1974) (lawyer suspended for a 
year where “the fee charged . . . was so exorbitant . . . as to shock the conscience”); Geoffrey C. 
Hazard, Jr., et al., The Law and Ethics of Lawyering 682 (5th ed. 2010) (“Bar leaders and 
professional codes speak out against the use of delay as a deliberate harassing tactic, but eminent 
lawyers often boast shamelessly at professional meetings of their skills in delaying cases.”). 
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Shakespeare’s famous line, “The first thing we do, let’s kill all the 
lawyers,”17 personifies the historical vilification of lawyers. This attitude 
has persisted. At the turn into the nineteenth century, Jeremy Bentham 
launched a wholesale attack on the common law, which he called the 
“Demon of Chicane,” and by extension an attack on the entire practice 
of law.18 Near the turn into the twentieth century, Carl Sandburg, in The 
Lawyers Know Too Much, asked: “Why does a hearse horse snicker/ 
[h]auling a lawyer away?”19 More recently, Dean Robert Post said that 
“the lawyer is the . . . embodiment of the tension . . . between . . . common 
community and the urge toward individual independence and self-
assertion.”20 
Before proceeding to modern systematic critiques, it is useful first to 
recount the basic legal obligations that govern a lawyer’s relationship 
with a client. These are the duty of confidentiality, the related rules of 
attorney-client privilege and work-product immunity, and the duty of 
loyalty. 
A.  Confidentiality 
The duty of confidentiality is prescribed in the American Bar 
Association Model Rules of Professional Conduct (“RPC”), Rule 1.6. 
That rule or a similar version is in effect in every American jurisdiction, 
and substantially similar rules are in effect in other constitutional 
regimes.21 Rule 1.6 (a) provides: “A lawyer shall not reveal information 
relating to the representation of a client unless the client gives informed 
consent, the disclosure is impliedly authorized in order to carry out the 
representation or the disclosure is permitted by paragraph (b).”22 This 
obligation applies to information received not only from the client, but 
also from other sources.23 The phrase “impliedly authorized” expresses 
the general legal concept that an agent, such as a lawyer, has authority to 
use client information to further the purpose of the engagement.24 A 
number of exceptions are set forth in Rule 1.6(b), for example allowing 
disclosure to prevent the client from committing a crime or fraud in 
which the lawyer’s services had been used.25 
 
 17. William Shakespeare, Henry VI, Part II 154 (Louis B. Wright & Virginia A. LaMar eds., 
Washington Square Press 1966) (1591). 
 18. 19 The Works of Jeremy Bentham 35 (John Bowring ed. 1842). 
 19. Carl Sandburg, Complete Poems 189 (rev. ed. 1970). 
 20. Robert C. Post, On the Popular Image of the Lawyer: Reflections in a Dark Glass, 75 Calif. 
L. Rev. 379, 389 (1987). 
 21. See Hazard & Dondi, supra note 6, at ch. 6. 
 22. Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.6(b) (2013). 
 23. See Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers §§ 59–67 (2000). 
 24. See Restatement (Third) of the Law of Agency § 2.02 (2006). 
 25. Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.6(b) (2013). 
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It may be noted that there is a similar duty of confidentiality in all 
“agency” relationships, such as that of employee, and in many 
professional relationships, such as the practice of medicine and nursing, 
accounting, and financial advising. 
For lawyers there are parallel provisions in the law of evidence—the 
attorney-client privilege and the attorney work-product immunity. These 
rules apply in litigation and investigations. The attorney-client privilege 
provides that a client (and her lawyer) generally may not be required to 
disclose communications to and from the lawyer. It operates like the 
privilege against self-incrimination in that it precludes the court, as well 
as an opposing party, from pursuing disclosure. Further, the privilege is 
available to business organizations such as corporations.26 
The attorney work-product immunity provides that a lawyer may 
invoke secrecy concerning documents and other information prepared or 
compiled in work done for the client.27 Like the attorney-client privilege, 
it is recognized in all American jurisdictions. 
B.  Loyalty 
The lawyer’s professional duty of loyalty is formally stated in 
negative terms. RPC 1.7(a) provides: 
[A] lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation involves a 
concurrent conflict of interest. A concurrent conflict of interest exists 
if: 
(1) the representation of one client will be directly adverse to 
another client; or 
(2) there is a significant risk that the representation of one or 
more clients will be materially limited by the lawyer’s responsibilities 
to another client, a former client or a third person or by a personal 
interest of the lawyer.28 
The duty of loyalty is expressed affirmatively in Rule 1.3: “A lawyer shall 
act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client.”29 
The duty of loyalty is extended to former clients through Rule 1.9, which 
prohibits representation that is “materially adverse” to a former client in 
“the same or a substantially related matter.”30 For example, if client A 
was provided an assessment of one of its patents, the lawyer could not 
later bring a suit against client A concerning that patent. Exceptions to 
the duty of loyalty are provided for, but acting on them generally 
requires consent by the affected clients.31 
 
 26. See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 392 (1981). 
 27. See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947); Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3). 
 28. Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.7(a) (2013). 
 29. Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.3 (2013). 
 30. Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.9(a) (2013). 
 31. Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.9(b) (2013). 
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The rules of confidentiality and loyalty also generally apply not only 
to the lawyer personally involved, but also to other lawyers in the same 
firm. This requirement is imposed by Rule 1.10, which “imputes” to all 
lawyers in a firm a limitation imposed on any of its lawyers.32 Thus, when 
lawyer A receives confidences of a client, lawyer B in the same firm has 
an obligation to maintain that confidence. In United States v. O’Hagan,33 
for example, a lawyer was found to have illegally used information about 
a corporate client of the firm—not one he was personally involved 
with—to buy the company’s stock offering. 
C.  Charles Curtis’ THE ETHICS OF ADVOCACY 
An influential beginning of systematic critiques was a 1951 article in 
the Stanford Law Review, The Ethics of Advocacy, by Charles Curtis, a 
well-established Boston lawyer.34 Curtis expanded his discussion in It’s 
Your Law, where he wrote that a lawyer is required to “treat outsiders as 
if they were barbarians and enemies,”35 that one of a lawyer’s functions is 
“to lie for his client,”36 and that a lawyer is required to “say things which 
he does not believe in.”37 These characterizations, although accurate as 
to some lawyers’ behavior, are hyperbole. There are rules and sanctions 
against such conduct.38 More important, as a practical matter, oppression 
of a witness can antagonize a jury or judge and induce retaliation by 
opposing counsel. 
Two of Curtis’ pronouncements remain key in criticisms of law 
practice: that a lawyer may lie for his client and that he may make 
arguments he does not believe in. Among more recent critiques are ones 
by Daniel Markovits, William Simon, David Luban, and Arthur 
Applebaum. Norman Spaulding takes a more unusual approach. 
D.  David Markovits 
The critique by Professor Daniel Markovits is the most recent and 
most trenchant. It also seems most clearly wrong. 
Professor Markovits leads off by stating that law practice necessarily 
requires that lawyers “lie” and “cheat.”39 He argues that this conduct is 
 
 32. Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.10(a) (2013). 
 33. 521 U.S. 642 (1997). 
 34. Charles P. Curtis, The Ethics of Advocacy, 4 Stan. L. Rev. 3 (1951).  
 35. Charles P. Curtis, It’s Your Law 8 (1954).  
 36. Id. at 10. 
 37. Id. at 17. 
 38. Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct Rs. 3.4, 4.4 (2013). See, e.g., Hawk v. Superior Court, 
116 Cal. Rptr. 713 (Cal. Ct. App. 1974); In re Reisch, 474 N.Y.S.2d 741 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984). 
 39. Markovits, supra note 7, at 3–4. 
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nevertheless virtuous because lawyers thereby lead clients to appreciate 
the legitimacy of the legal process, the rule of law, and democracy itself.40 
On its face, this idea is bizarre. One would think a lawyer’s lying and 
cheating could only be appreciated by clients who themselves are liars 
and cheaters. No doubt there are such clients, and there are lawyers who 
approximate Markovits’ vision. But can it be imagined that a typical 
client, upon winning a verdict, leaves court enthusiastically proclaiming, 
“We really cheated them, didn’t we!”? As Professor Simon has observed, 
most ordinary citizens do not associate “arguing false inferences or any 
other form of ‘lying’ or ‘cheating’ with fair procedure or with any kind of 
legitimacy.”41 
Simon questions the source of Markovits’ thesis, which is that 
lawyers somehow impersonate and “imaginatively identify with” the 
client.42 Markovits adapted this thesis from writings of John Keats, a poet 
in the early nineteenth century. However, the adaptation is worse than 
questionable. 
The term taken from Keats is “negative capability,” which Keats 
used in a letter to his brothers. Discussing theatre, specifically 
Shakespeare’s Richard III, Keats said: “[I]t struck me what quality went 
to form a man of achievement, especially in literature, and which 
Shakespeare possessed so enormously—I mean negative capability, that 
is, when a man is capable of being in uncertainties, mysteries, doubts, 
without any irritable reaching after fact and reason.”43 
In employing Keats’ term “negative capability,” Markovits omits the 
words “capable of being in uncertainties, mysteries, doubts.” That phrase 
would indeed describe what Keats was talking about—Richard III’s state 
of mind in Shakespeare’s play.44 Instead, Markovits conjoins “negative 
capability” with a passage from a different Keats letter written a year 
later to someone else. In that letter Keats talks about how a poet—an 
author—can project his identity onto inanimate things such as the sun 
and moon.45 From this, Markovits constructs “negative capability” for a 
lawyer, who he says “is similarly required, by . . . professional 
detachment, to efface herself . . . [a]nd through this self-effacement . . . to 
work continually as a mouthpiece for her client.”46 In simpler language, 
 
 40. Id. at 5.  
 41. William H. Simon, Role Differentiation and Lawyers’ Ethics: A Critique of Some Academic 
Perspectives, 23 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 987, 995 (2010). 
 42. Id. at 996 n.21. 
 43. Letter from John Keats to George and Thomas Keats (Dec. 22, 1817), in Life, Letters, and 
Literary Remains, of John Keats 70, 71 (Richard Monkton Milnes ed., 1848) (emphasis in original). 
 44. See William Shakespeare, Richard III act 1, sc. 2. 
 45. Letter from John Keats to Richard Woodhouse (Oct. 27, 1818), in Life, Letters, and 
Literary Remains, of John Keats, supra note 43, at 149, 150. 
 46. Markovits, supra note 7, at 93. 
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the proposition is that a lawyer, in acting on behalf of a client, must make 
herself disappear—“efface herself.” 
This portrayal of a lawyer is simply wrong. Our legal system 
requires a lawyer not to “efface” herself but to positively assert a distinct 
professional identity, for example, “Your honor, my name is Sarah Smith 
and I represent . . . .” A lawyer can properly speak on behalf of a client 
only because she has a professional identity and the “right of audience” 
separate from that of her client. A lawyer cannot properly “personify” a 
client as a witness, for a lawyer is prohibited from asserting “personal 
knowledge of facts in issue.”47 And there is a nest of rules imposing 
responsibilities on lawyers concerning their forensic conduct.48 A lawyer 
also must maintain the professional independence and detachment 
required in competent practice. 
“Effacement” also says nothing about the role of lawyer in giving 
advice. Advice from a lawyer to a client is intelligible only if client and 
lawyer are distinct—or is the client advising himself? 
E.  William Simon 
Professor William Simon in The Practice of Justice develops a quite 
different critique of the legal profession. 
The profession’s official understanding is that a lawyer should 
loyally further the client’s lawful interests, regardless of whether those 
interests conform to the lawyer’s conception of justice.49 Simon 
concludes that the lawyer’s loyalty should be to a higher ideal of 
“justice,” according to which the lawyer should autonomously determine 
the client’s proper interests and then pursue “actions that, considering 
the relevant circumstances of the particular case, seem likely to promote 
justice.”50 
Professor Simon illustrates his thesis with a hypothetical in which a 
young lawyer is representing a university in a dispute with a labor 
union.51 There is a lawful but “technical” objection to the union’s 
eligibility to represent university workers. In this setting, Simon says the 
lawyer should conclude that justice requires disregarding the legal 
technicality, thereby allowing the union to proceed with its organizing 
campaign. 
 
 47. Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 3.4(e) (2013). 
 48. Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 3.1–3.4 (2013). 
 49. Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.16(b)(4) (2013) (“A lawyer may withdraw . . . [if] the 
client insists upon taking action that the lawyer considers repugnant . . . .”); Restatement (Third) of 
the Law Governing Lawyers § 32(3)(f) (2000). There appear to be no reported decisions in which a 
lawyer has taken such a step. See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. & W. William Hodes, The Law of 
Lawyering § 20.9 (3d ed. 2013). 
 50. William H. Simon, The Practice of Justice: A Theory of Lawyers’ Ethics 138 (1988). 
 51. Id. at 151–56.  
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As Professors Woolley and Wendel observe in a criticism of this 
thesis: “Simon’s ideal lawyer must inquire into the deep structure of the 
community’s law to determine what apparent legal entitlements are just 
(or meritorious, as he sometimes puts it) and which are formally valid 
but not to be respected by a ‘contextual’ lawyer.”52 
Professor Simon assumes that a concept of “justice” is clearly 
discernible and widely shared. Furthermore, as Woolley and Wendel 
observe, Professor Simon’s lawyer is “emotionally stable, introverted, 
fearless, calm, cognitively reflective and rarely automatic, free of 
cognitive biases, and highly intelligent,”53 quite like Professor Simon. 
And, one might add, the junior lawyer is free of such burdens as student 
loan debt and dependents and also has other employment opportunities 
at the ready. 
Professor Simon’s hypothetical lawyer is a junior associate, perhaps 
because it is difficult to imagine that an experienced lawyer would think 
it ethical to follow the Simon recipe. Indeed, it is improbable that even 
junior lawyers would think it proper to do so. As Professor Wasserstrom 
observed, “[O]nce [a] lawyer has agreed to represent the client . . . it 
[would be] morally wrong to defeat the client’s expectations about . . . 
the lawyer’s actions on the client’s behalf.”54 Moreover, a lawyer’s 
reluctance to disregard a favorable technicality is not because she cannot 
imagine a better state of justice. Nor is it because she cannot distinguish 
between a legal technicality and substantive justice. It is because an 
experienced lawyer recognizes, as Wasserstrom says, that asserting her 
autonomous sense of “justice” to override the client’s lawful position 
would be a rank betrayal of the client. It would also be a breach of a legal 
duty to the client.55 
An experienced lawyer is just as likely as a junior one to think that 
union activity was not necessarily beneficial for the client’s employees; 
there have been corrupt or exploitive unions. An experienced lawyer 
would know that legal technicalities are often expeditious means of 
achieving lawful objectives. 
Beyond these considerations, in a regime where such autonomy 
were permissible, it can only be imagined how prospective employers of 
legal staff—law firms and corporate law departments—would function. 
Knowing that clients would be fearful of assigning their matters to 
impetuous swords of the lord, prospective employers would interrogate 
employment candidates about their concepts of loyalty and justice. Law 
 
 52. Alice Woolley & W. Bradley Wendel, Legal Ethics and Moral Character, 23 Geo. J. Legal 
Ethics 1065, 1084 (2010) (citation omitted). 
 53. Id. at 1085. 
 54. Richard Wasserstrom, Roles and Morality, in The Good Lawyer, supra note 1, at 25, 31. 
 55. Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.7 cmt. 1 (2013) (“Loyalty and independent judgment 
are essential elements in the lawyer's relationship to a client.”). 
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firms thereby would be constituted of lawyers rigidly conforming to 
conventional professional responsibility and to ideals of justice that 
Professor Simon would rightly regard as reactionary. 
Nevertheless, Professor Simon demonstrates that lawyers are often 
called upon to pursue objectives for a client that they would not seek for 
themselves. The discrepancy between a lawyer’s sense of right and the 
duty to client is the pivot on which ordinary law practice can be said to 
be immoral. Indeed, it is the lawyer’s personal sense of right that would 
result in that assessment. 
Professor Simon is surely right in concluding that lawyers should 
think not only about legal technicalities, but also about justice in broader 
moral-political terms. RPC 2.1 permits and encourages such a 
perspective: “In rendering advice, a lawyer may refer not only to law but 
to other considerations such as moral, economic, social and political 
factors . . . .”56 Thus, in his hypothetical, the junior’s reflection about 
justice could lead her to suggest that the client-university not resort to 
legal technicality. Among a typical university’s constituents are people 
who would think that relying on such a technicality was antisocial and 
dishonorable. 
F.  David Luban 
Professor David Luban has provided the most extensive discussion 
on the relation between lawyers’ ethics and what is taken to be common 
morality. His basic thesis is that there is a “genuine tension between 
common morality and role moralities,” particularly the role morality of 
law practice.57 
Like most critics, Luban accepts that, whatever might be common 
morality, the role of defense counsel in criminal cases is morally 
defensible, even if it involves a lawyer trying to persuade a judge or jury 
of something the lawyer himself does not believe. The strongest defense 
of that position has been that by Professor Monroe Freedman in 
Professional Responsibility of the Criminal Defense Lawyer.58 The 
justification is that criminal prosecution involves the power of the state 
pitched against a relatively helpless accused, whose dignity requires 
stalwart defensive advocacy. 
In other writings, Professor Luban has been somewhat ambivalent 
about the moral legitimacy of criminal defense, saying that “[When] a 
lawyer defending a guilty [client] . . . succeeds in winning an acquittal, an 
 
 56. Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 2.1 (2013). 
 57. David Luban, Lawyers and Justice: An Ethical Study 125 (1988). 
 58. Monroe H. Freedman, Professional Responsibility of the Criminal Defense Lawyer, 64 Mich. 
L. Rev. 1469 (1966); see Monroe H. Freedman & Abbe Smith, Understanding Lawyers’ Ethics (4th 
ed. 2010).  
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injustice is done.”59 This criticism, however, involves a serious confusion 
of categories. The acquittal of an accused in the legal system is “justice” 
according to law. If an acquittal is a moral “injustice,” it is because the 
lawyer “knows” that his client was guilty. But the lawyer “knows” of his 
client’s guilt through the lawyer’s personal assessment of the client, a 
source of information that is excluded in administering justice according 
to law. 
In any event, the justification for defending an accused does not 
extend to civil litigation, or to representation in negotiation and 
transaction work, which are the typical activities of most lawyers. 
Concerning these forms of law practice, Professor Luban has said that 
“Anything . . . that is morally wrong for a nonlawyer to do on behalf of 
another person is morally wrong for a lawyer to do as well.”60 In accord 
with Professor Simon, Luban proposes that the rules “be redrafted to 
allow lawyers to forego immoral tactics or the pursuit of unjust ends.”61 
However, the RPC has already gone a distance in that direction. Rule 
1.16(b)(4) permits a lawyer to withdraw if “the client insists upon taking 
action that the lawyer considers repugnant or with which the lawyer has a 
fundamental disagreement.”62 
On the other hand, Alan Donagan recognizes the heterogeneity of 
the community’s mores: “Individuals and institutions in [modern 
industrial] society will not only have various ends their pursuit of which 
will sometimes bring them into conflict, but will also uphold different 
views of what is morally permissible and socially desirable.”63 And yet 
Professor Luban does not acknowledge that in such a milieu, there is no 
“common morality” with which to contrast lawyer morality. Nor could 
the community’s jumble of moral ideas yield a definite idea of “justice,” 
which is the basis of Professor Simon’s critique. 
G.  Norman Spaulding 
Professor Norman Spaulding’s thoughtful analyses of law practice 
and professional ethics goes in a different direction.64 He criticizes a 
widely shared justification for the attorney-client privilege embraced by 
the Supreme Court—that it facilitates client “compliance” with law.65 
 
 59. Luban, supra note 57, at 145. Luban’s “guilty client” is a client that the attorney “knows” is 
guilty of the charged crime. 
 60. David Luban, Lawyers and Justice: An Ethical Study 154 (1988). 
 61. Luban, supra note 57, at 159. 
 62. Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R 1.16(b)(4) (2013). 
 63. Alan Donagan, Justifying Legal Practice in the Adversary System, in The Good Lawyer, 
supra note 1, at 123, 128. 
 64. See Norman W. Spaulding, Reinterpreting Professional Identity, 74 U. Colo. L. Rev. 1 
(2003); Norman W. Spaulding, The Privilege of Probity, 26 Geo. J. Legal Ed. 301 (2013). 
 65. See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981); Norman W. Spaulding, Compliance, Creative 
Deviance, and Resistance to Law: A Theory of the Attorney-Client Privilege, 2013 J. Prof’l Law. 135. 
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Professor Spaulding says that this rationale is wrong as a matter of 
history and policy. He argues that a client is entitled, not only to know 
how to comply with the law, but to a realistic appraisal of whether the 
law will actually be enforced. He is surely correct that clients often want 
to include “legal risk” in considering a proposed course of action. By 
implication, Spaulding affirms that it is not immoral to give advice that 
could lead a client to pursue a legally wrongful course of conduct. 
Spaulding further suggests that the rules as written do not allow the 
lawyer to engage in such realism. However, Rule 1.2(d) provides: “A 
lawyer shall not counsel a client to engage, or assist a client, in conduct 
that the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent, but a lawyer may discuss 
the legal consequences of any proposed course of conduct with a 
client . . . .”66 A lawyer can properly interpret this rule as allowing a 
client to be given a realistic appraisal of legal risk. Given what many 
consider to be our excessive legal regulations, and their very uneven 
enforcement, providing realistic advice about legal deviance is surely 
defensible. 
H.  Arthur Applebaum 
Professor Arthur Applebaum makes the usual criticisms that “good 
lawyers . . . intentionally attempt to convince judges, jurors, litigants, and 
contracting parties of the truth of propositions that the lawyer believes to 
be false,” and that “part of what adversaries in professional life do for a 
living is violate persons by deceiving and coercing them.”67 Of special 
interest, however, is Applebaum’s recognition of similarities between the 
ethical problems of practicing lawyers and those confronting other 
professionals, specifically business managers, politicians, and military 
officers. There are two basic points in the comparisons. 
First, in our open and conflict-ridden society, there are many roles 
and relationships that entail partisanship, deception, and use of coercion. 
They involve protagonists on behalf of constituents or “clients”—people 
and institutions favored by the actor. Second, the roles of these 
protagonists are lawful and serve “our needs for social order,” in 
Bernard Williams’ phrase. 
Thus, business managers are committed to the interests of their 
company’s shareholders, employees, customers, suppliers, and people 
near its facilities. Business operations employ the coercion involved in 
business competition. Business managers can use lawful force to 
discharge unsatisfactory subordinates and terminate unsatisfactory 
external engagements. Sometimes they must dissimulate, for example, 
 
 66. Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.2(d) (2013). 
 67. Arthur I. Applebaum, Ethics for Adversaries: The Morality of Roles in Public and 
Professional Life 104, 175 (1999). 
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about a company’s trade secrets and its profit prospects. Business 
managers are regulated directly through the concept of fiduciary duties 
and indirectly through the network of regulations imposed on the 
enterprises they manage, for example, accuracy in company financial 
statements, fairness to employees, environmental compliance, and so on.68 
Among politicians, those holding elective office are partisans who 
succeeded in competitive elections. Politicians use propaganda; they 
affirm propositions they may not personally believe in; they often 
minimize what their programs will cost. They are regulated by standards 
such as residence requirements and by legal definitions of their positions, 
for example, a district attorney cannot vote in the city council. 
Legislatures, city councils, and other deliberative bodies are governed by 
procedural rules.69 
The managers of modern administrative agencies are more or less 
politicians.70 Agencies are governed by networks of rules that govern 
their jurisdiction, procedure, and regulatory powers. Their internal 
processes are often obscure, so that knowing how an agency actually 
works is a valuable asset. 
The military’s very purpose is use of force and military technique 
inherently includes large-scale deception. As agents for a sovereign 
principal, military officers carry out missions in which they may not have 
confidence. Their projects often inflict injury on innocent third parties, 
“collateral damage” as it is now called. Nevertheless, military operations 
are governed by law, notably “Lincoln’s Code,” adopted in the Civil War 
and emulated by many other countries.71 The military is also indirectly 
regulated by international norms such as the Geneva Convention. 
In candid moments we recognize that partisanship, dissimulation, 
and coercion are elements of human existence. The “common morality” 
professed in the Judeo-Christian tradition demands that we “Do unto 
others as you would have them do unto you.” But we hold friends in 
greater favor than strangers and usually hold fellow countrymen in 
greater favor than aliens.72 Indeed, forms of injustice are pervasive in our 
own society. As Amartya Sen has said, they reflect “hardy social 
divisions, linked with divisions of class, gender, rank, location, religion, 
 
 68. These days, many businesses also have internal codes of conduct. See Janet S. Adams, et al., 
Codes of Ethics as Signals for Ethical Behavior, 29 J. Bus. Ethics 199 (2001). 
 69. The standard text is Robert’s Rules of Order. These were derived from the rules of the U.S. 
House of Representatives, and the modern version runs more than 250 pages. See Robert’s Rules of 
Order: Simplified and Applied (2d ed. 2001). 
 70. James Q. Wilson, Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and Why They Do It 302 (1989). 
 71. See generally John F. Witt, Lincoln’s Code: The Laws of War in American History 
(2012). 
 72. Aristotle noted that “[A] man does not seem to have the same duties to a friend, a stranger, a 
comrade, and a schoolfellow.” Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics bk. VIII, at 159 (Lesley Brown ed., 
David Ross trans., Oxford Univ. Press 2009) (c. 384 B.C.E.). 
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community and other established barriers.”73 Professor Michael Walzer 
has tried to reconcile the facts of discriminatory social practice with the 
ideal of equal justice, but in unconvincing terms.74 The “distinct 
understandings” in a society can call for grossly unequal treatment of 
some community members, such as the Untouchables in India.75 
These are among the “imperfections” that generate “social needs,” 
as Professor Williams said. Sir Isaiah Berlin offers an alternative moral 
framework that deserves recognition. 
VII.  Berlin’s MACHIAVELLI 
A framework distinct from “common morality” is presented by Sir 
Isaiah Berlin in The Originality of Machiavelli.76 Passages from 
Machiavelli’s The Prince illustrate what Berlin is talking about. 
Machiavelli says that a ruler must be “a great feigner and dissembler”77 
and exercise “cunning assisted by fortune.”78 He must appear to be 
religiously upright, but “a prudent ruler ought not to keep faith when by 
doing so it would be against his interest.”79  
Berlin interprets Machiavelli as setting up two competing moralities. 
According to Machiavelli, different people pursue different ends. “Men 
need rulers because they require someone to order human groups 
governed by diverse interests and bring them security, stability, [and] 
protection against enemies.”80 These diverse interests lead to two 
moralities. “One is the morality of the pagan world: its values are 
courage, vigour, fortitude in adversity, . . . order, discipline, . . . justice, . . . 
and [the] power needed to secure their satisfaction . . . . Against this 
moral universe . . . stands . . . [the other morality], Christian morality”—
we should say Judeo-Christian morality, with its virtues of “charity, 
mercy, sacrifice, . . . [and] forgiveness of enemies.”81 “Society is, 
normally, a battlefield in which there are conflicts between and within 
groups. These conflicts can be controlled only by the judicious use of 
both persuasion and force.”82 
 
 73. Amartya Sen, The Idea of Justice 389 (2009). 
 74. He defines justice as beliefs “rooted in the distinct understandings of . . . a shared way of life,” 
and states that “[t]o override those understandings is . . . to act unjustly.” Michael Walzer, Spheres 
of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and Equality 314 (1983). 
 75. Walzer evidently did not notice the social coercion that kept the Untouchables in their place. 
 76. See Isaiah Berlin, The Originality of Machiavelli, in Against the Current: Essays in the 
History of Ideas 25, 25 (Henry Hardy ed., 2001).  
 77. See Niccolò Machiavelli, The Prince 70 (Luigi Ricci trans., R&R Ltd. 1901) (1532).  
 78. Id. at 37. “Fortune” refers to fortuna, the unpredictability in events. 
 79. Id. at 70. 
 80. See Berlin, supra note 76, at 40. 
 81. Id. at 45. 
 82. Id. at 41. 
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According to Berlin, “what are commonly thought of as the central 
Christian virtues . . . are insuperable obstacles to the building of . . . [a] 
society that . . . satisfies men’s permanent desires and interests.”83 
Indeed, “men who pursue [Christian] ideals are bound to be defeated 
and to lead other people to ruin.”84 He concludes that individuals “are 
perfectly entitled to lead a morally good life[] [and] be a private 
citizen . . . [b]ut . . . must not make [themselves] responsible for the lives 
of others.”85 “There are two worlds, that of personal morality and that of 
public organisation.”86 
Berlin then returns to a proposition that is woven into many of his 
other writings. He states that “[o]ne of the deepest assumptions of 
western political thought is . . . that there exists some single principle which 
not only regulates the course of the sun and the stars, but . . . . functions 
. . . in a single harmonious whole . . . .”87 However, according to Berlin, 
“there might exist ends . . . which were equally ultimate, but incompatible 
with one another, that there might exist no single universal overarching 
standard . . . .”88 
Berlin concludes, “[T]he path is open to empiricism, pluralism, 
[and] . . . compromise.”89 
A.  “Personal Morality” and “Public Organization” 
Berlin’s two moral categories, “personal morality” and “public 
organization,” are useful in thinking about the morality of law practice. 
The domain of “personal morality” is secularized Judeo-Christianity and 
roughly corresponds to what David Luban has called “common 
morality” and, as we have seen, what William Simon refers to as 
“justice.” This morality is manifested in friendship, empathy, honesty, 
community, accommodation, and a measure of charity. In our society, 
most people who become lawyers have been brought up in a Judeo-
Christian milieu and its corresponding morality. Their pre-law 
acculturation survives entry into the practice of law, so that most lawyers 
accept Judeo-Christianity as their “personal morality” and practice it in 
relationships with family and friends. 
Some forms of law practice can partake of “personal morality.” 
Such can be said of the professional practice of the classic “elbow 
lawyer,” that is, a trusted legal counsel sitting at the client’s elbow. 
Indeed, Professor Charles Fried has argued that all client relationships 
 
 83. Id. at 46. 
 84. Id. at 49. 
 85. Id. at 57. 
 86. Id. at 58. 
 87. Id. at 67. 
 88. Id. at 69. 
 89. Id. at 78. 
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are a kind of friendship.90 But most client-lawyer relationships are 
commercial friendships governed by terms of an engagement contract 
and receding when that contract expires. 
The other world, “public organization,” involves affairs of the polis, 
to use the classic Greek term for a social-political community. The polis, 
as Berlin observes, is a “battlefield in which there are conflicts between 
and within groups.”91 To the same effect is Donagan’s observation that 
members of our society “not only have various ends . . . but . . . different 
views of what is morally permissible and socially desirable.”92  
The thesis derived from Machiavelli is that these “different views” 
and “conflicts between and within groups” can be kept under control 
only with the aid of “rulers.” Machiavelli had in mind the Florentine 
rulers; their modern counterparts are officials and groups in government 
with authority to fashion and administer policies for the whole 
community. To carry out its functions, government employs what Berlin 
calls “judicious use of both persuasion and force.”93 Law is the 
instrument of the technique and the lawyer’s vocation deploys that 
instrument. 
Many lawyers have not squarely confronted these characteristics of 
their professional calling, including the tension between their personal 
morality and the mores of their vocation. When lawyers speak of 
“justice” they usually refer to their discourses on behalf of clients and the 
deliberations of judges—peaceful exercises in rationality—information 
that is protected by the lawyer’s duty of confidentiality and hence 
excluded. But force is in the background and the legal order combines 
reason and fiat. 
The key transaction in the lawyer’s calling is admission to the bar. 
This is often viewed as a mere formality and indeed a nuisance. 
However, legally, it is a critical transformation of identity. Peaceful 
adherence to judicial decisions usually prevails, supported by recognition 
that force may be brought to bear if it does not. The law graduate can 
adhere to traditional Judeo-Christian morality in personal relationships 
and some professional ones. In becoming a member of the bar, however, 
the law graduate becomes ex officio an “officer of the legal system.”94 
Becoming ex officio an officer of the legal system should include 
 
 90. See Charles Fried, The Lawyer as Friend: The Moral Foundations of the Lawyer-Client 
Relation, 85 Yale L.J. 1060 (1976). 
 91. Berlin, supra note 76, at 41. 
 92. Alan Donagan, Justifying Legal Practice in the Adversary System, in The Good Lawyer, 
supra note 1, at 123, 128. 
 93. Berlin, supra note 76, at 41. 
 94. The Preamble to the ABA Model Rules states: “A lawyer, as a member of the legal 
profession, is a representative of clients, an officer of the legal system and a public citizen having 
special responsibility for the quality of justice.” Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct pmbl. P1 (2013). 
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recognition that the governing professional mores are distinct from their 
personal mores, quite as the governing mores of a military officer are 
distinct from their personal mores. The professional outlook should be 
sober about the contrariness of human behavior and the possibilities of 
true justice. Faithful commitment to an imperfect system can make it a 
“higher calling.” 
B.  Participating in Government 
Many lawyers would be startled, indeed offended, at being 
identified as instruments of the government. This identity would be 
particularly uncomfortable for lawyers engaged in representing 
victimized people and radical causes. It probably would be equally 
galling to lawyers engaged in representing conservative causes. But 
lawyers across the professional spectrum are engaged in invoking the law 
and thus bringing to bear the coercive power of government. On the left, 
they do so, for example, by seeking injunctions against environmental 
violations or employment discrimination, pursuing habeas corpus for 
prisoners, lobbying for reform legislation, and so on. On the right there is 
defense of corporations, finding openings in the tax laws, and so on. 
The practice of law can be viewed as a highly decentralized form of 
the separation of powers. Familiar forms of the separation of powers are, 
of course, the division of authority between the legislative and the 
executive, and the division between them and the judiciary. The power 
exercised in law practice, even by lawyers employed in the government, 
is derivative from the authority of the judiciary. Lawyers have legal 
capacity, by virtue of their professional status, to invoke the judicial 
authority to challenge other elements of the government (suing the 
police for example), or to interdict some other actor in the private sector 
(such as suing a landlord).95 
The client-lawyer relationship is thus political as well as legal. As 
said by Robert Kutak, head of the committee that drafted the ABA 
Model Rules: “The basic premise of virtually all our institutions is that 
open and relatively unrestrained competition among individuals produces 
the maximum collective good. . . . [T]he adversary system of justice reflects 
the same deep-seated values we place on competition among economic 
suppliers, political parties, and moral and political ideas.”96 
 
 95. The coercive effect of litigation can operate in cases that do not go to trial. In the pretrial 
stage, parties have to submit to interrogation in depositions and hand over relevant documents; the 
resulting disclosures can be embarrassing. Parties often settle to avoid such exposure. 
 96. Robert J. Kutak, The Adversary System and the Practice of Law, in The Good Lawyer, supra 
note 1, at 172, 173–74. 
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Conclusion 
In political terms the lawyer-client relationship can be understood as 
a small caucus organized to put pressure on some other element in the 
polis. Visualized in this way, the client-lawyer combination fits into the 
classic political theory of John Locke. In The Second Treatise of 
Government, Locke says: 
[E]very man [who has] entered into civil society, has [thereby] quitted 
his power to punish . . . which he has given up to the legislative in all 
cases where he can appeal to the magistrate, he has given a right to the 
commonwealth to employ his force for the execution of the judgments 
of the commonwealth . . . they being made by himself or his 
representative. . . . [T]he legislative and executive power . . . judge . . . 
how far injuries from without are to be vindicated . . . .97 
 
 97. John Locke, Of Civil Government Second Treatise 69–70 (Henry Regnery Co. 1966) (1689). 
